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SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS IN GOVERNMENT, 1878-1896 — PART I* 
Vittorio M.G. de Vecchi (1941-1983) 
1 
There seems to have existed a notion — one may almost say a 
corporate myth — that the Royal Society of Canada did since 
its foundation serve as a kind of advisory board to the Government 
on scientific matters.! The leaders of the first group of 
Fellows nourished the hope of performing just such a function. 
Admittedly, it v/as natural to hope that a national learned 
society whose scientific sections were largely composed of 
government employees would develop into an effective 'trans­
mission belt1 between science and politics. Likewise, the sum 
of the achievements of Fellows of the Royal Society of Canada 
in the employment of the state could be perceived as the collec­
tive record of achievement of the Society itself. Further anal­
ysis, however, shows both the hope and the perception to be fal­
lacious. 
The repeated failures of the Johnson committee of the Royal 
Society to persuade the government to sponsor the study of tides 
are an example of the almost total lack of influence of the 
national learned body. In the end a small appropriation was 
granted after a strong representation on the part of the shipping 
industry. As for the other programmes proposed by the British 
Association, either they found a place in existing activities 
(reduction of magnetic observations, permafrost) or the problem 
of government sponsorship was by-passed by means of a BA grant 
(ethnology). In short, on those occasions in which the Royal 
Society took corporate action the results were very disappoint­
ing. 
The men of science expressed their understanding of the reasons 
for the lack of effective communication with government in 
terms of pure and abstract science VA. applied and utilitarian 
science — sowing and reaping, enlightened self-denial and mater­
ialism. Correct as this diagnosis might have been, it was in a 
sense incomplete. For, besides all consideration of the par­
ticular type of science and scientists likely to be of benefit 
to the nation or of use in the realization of favourite policies, 
politicians usually paid particular attention to those issues 
that would extend or threaten their political basis. It is per­
haps a comment on 19th-century Canada to note that no political 
career was helped (and much less threatened) by matters connec­
ted with the relations between science and government. It is 
possible, however, to identify the political interests that the 
governmental scientific activities of the period 1878-1896 more 
* The second of three articles drawn from the doctoral disser­
tation of the late Dr Vittorio de Vecchi, this article is 
a slightly revised version of Chapter 4. The final, compan­
ion article drawn from Chapter 5 will appear in the 
December 1985 number. Ed. 
113 
or less marginally served: shipping and agriculture could bene­
fit from astronomical, magnetic and meteorological studies; the 
Hudson's Bay explorations were inspired by strategic worries 
and by the hope of finding an alternative route to the North 
West; contributing to the expenses of the international circum-
polar observations, and of the observation of the transit of 
Venus on 6 December 1882, Canada did her bit as a part of the 
British Empire and as an emerging nation; finally, the Geological 
Survey was meant to be of use to the mining industry and in the 
settlement of the West. It is open to question — indeed, it 
was repeatedly queried in the 'eighties — whether these scien­
tific activities were actually beneficial to the interests they 
purportedly served; the themes that emerged in the numerous con­
troversies are discussed below. First, however, agriculture 
should be considered as the basis of the Canadian economy and 
the activity which comprised the largest number of voters. 
2 
The 1867 British North America Act gave concurrent powers of 
legislation respecting agriculture and immigration to the 
Dominion and to the provinces. At first, the federal Department 
of Agriculture's main task was the promotion of immigration into 
Canada. Other, relatively secondary tasks were the administra­
tion of the Marine Hospital in Quebec, quarantine, statistics 
and patents and copyrights. As for agriculture proper, in 1873 
the Conservative Minister of Agriculture John H. Pope denied in 
Parliament that the government had any intention of establishing 
a Dominion Board of Agriculture. Later in the same session, he 
declared, upon questioning, that it was not the intention of the 
Government to establish an agricultural college with a model 
farm attached.2 It was a sensitive issue: as early as May 
1868, just after Confederation, the Liberal opposition fought 
against the very existence of a federal department of agricul­
ture; they even attempted to introduce a last-minute amendment 
to the organisation bill, formally barring the future depart­
ment from meddling with agricultural matters, but the amendment 
was defeated upon division.^ 
It can be argued that the reasons for the emergence of agricul­
ture as a federal concern in the 1870s must be searched for in 
the attempts of the Conservatives to woo the farmers' vote away 
from the Liberals. The latter, traditionally strong in rural 
Ontario and frequently in power in that province, opposed the 
Conservative moves out of a desire to preserve their own poli­
tical basis and to further the practice of de-centralisation. 
The Conservative attack concentrated on two main issues: that 
of the agricultural tariff and that of the need for new 'scien­
tific' farming methods. 
The first was clearly an extension of the general policy of pro­
tection that J.A. Macdonald and his party gradually espoused 
and eventually reaped electoral benefits from. In the spring 
of 1874, Dr George T. Orton, the Ontario Conservative MP, began 
vocally to champion the farming interest and to demand that a 
Select Committee be appointed to consider what would best fur­
ther the agricultural industry. He was sure, he said, that the 
farmers of Canada desired protection.^ The same theme and the 
demand for an agricultural committee were brought up again with 
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renewed emphasis in the years 1873-78, during which the 
Conservatives were in the opposition in Ottawa. It was hinted 
that the Grangers (of whom more below) supported protectionism, 
and that they would submit within a year a petition in this sense 
bearing the signatures of 100,000 farmers.5 In reality, only 
5,000 signatures were collected, much to the puzzlement of the 
secretary of the Dominion Grange, and the petition was never 
made public.6 The rural vote, however, went largely in favour 
of the Tories at the 1878 election. 
The political appeal of the second issue used by the Conservatives 
in their bid to attract the rural vote was particularly hard to 
assess. The application of science, especially chemistry, and 
scientific techniques to agriculture is usually dated from the 
publication of Liebig's Vlo, oiganiàcke. Chzmlz Jin Ikno, Anw&Jidung 
aui AgsiZcultuti and Vky&iologlz (Brunswick, 1840) . The impact of 
Liebig's work, whose French and English translations appeared 
practically simultaneously with the German edition, was partic­
ularly great in America, where the fertility of the land in the 
settlements was steadily waning.7 The broad movement towards 
scientific and technical farming instruction, started in the US 
by the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862,found a limited Canadian 
counterpart in the opening of the Ontario Agricultural College 
in 1874.8 yet it was by no means clear, either in the United 
States or in Canada, that the farmers at large were persuaded 
of the utility of agricultural research; an element of tradi­
tionalism, of suspicion towards the new and towards outsiders, 
was frequently present among those agrarian communities. Thus, 
when the Conservatives, during the short years of Liberal rule, 
mixed their arguments in favour of protection for the farmers 
with suggestions of federal scientific assistance to agriculture, 
the Liberals countered, repeating Joseph Rymal's statement that 
the farmers 'merely wanted to be severely let alone.'9 It must 
be noted, in fairness, that the Liberal Minister of Agriculture 
Luc Letellier repeatedly pointed out, in his yearly reports, the 
possibility of a future endowment of 'Agronomic Institutes' that 
would engage in research and in the diffusion of information.10 
The generic terms, however, in which the ideas were expressed 
made it not much more concrete than the recommendations which, 
in the same sense, the Conservative ministers J.-C. Taché and 
John H. Pope had put forward as early as 1871 and 1872.H 
One of the elements of the Conservative offensive that riled 
Liberal MPs, such as the farmers Joseph Rymal and Robert Smith, 
was that the enemy champions of the agricultural interests in 
Parliament were Dr Orton (a medical man), the engineer Francis 
Jones and the shipbuilder Lachlan McCallum. Not only were they 
political opponents, they were outsiders.12 The sting of the 
accusation, and its immediate political relevance, was increased 
by the fact that, during the 1870s the Grange arrived in Canada 
from the United States, with its message of farmers; self-help 
and co-operation. 
The Order of the Patrons of Husbandry, also known as the Grange, 
although born on the Atlantic seaboard of the United States in 
the years immediately following the Civil War, found its natural 
environment in the states of the Midwest, as did many subsequent 
agrarian reform movements. In particular, the Grange gave a 
voice and a purpose to a widespread resentment against the 
115 
railways. Farmers, who at first welcomed the post-war railway 
boom and frequently invested their savings in those schemes of 
development, often found themselves cheated of their capital 
and exploited by the monopolistic practices of the railroad 
operators. It was only the largest and most immediate aspect 
of a new economic system, catering to manufacturing and commerce, 
that seemed not to take into account the needs and potential 
economic weight of agriculturists.13 Outsiders — railroad 
promoters, bankers, middlemen -— were then perceived as respon­
sible for the honest farmer's plight. The answer was to or­
ganise; the result was a flourishing of state-wide, Grange-
sponsored, co-operative ventures into distribution and marketing, 
the manufacture of farming implements, insurance and banking.14 
In a temporary reversal of the westward spread of the Order, the 
Grange took root in Vermont in 1872 and, immediately after that, 
in the Eastern Townships of Quebec. The agent of this remark­
able organising feat, the Vermonter Eben Thompson, soon realised 
that the fertile farming area of western Ontario and the Niagara 
Peninsula could provide an audience naturally receptive to the 
ideas fostered by the Grange. The first Ontario chapter of the 
Order was founded by Thompson in Pond Mills near London, in 
February 1874. The Master was William Beattie, farmer and sheep-
breeder at Pond Mills; John H. Elliot, a farmer of strong 
Reformist tendencies in politics, was Secretary; and Henry 
Anderson, another Reformer, was Lecturer.15 
With this move, Eben Thompson placed the Grange at the very 
heart of that aspect of Ontario, and later federal, agricultural 
politics that was to play a significant role in the establish­
ment of the Dominion Experimental Farm. The presence of Henry 
Anderson among the officers of the first Ontario chapter of the 
Order was symptomatic; his name appeared repeatedly among the 
organizers and office-holders of major initiatives. Anderson was 
one of the originators of the Western Fair Association and was 
its general superintendent between 1868 and 1871; in 1871 he 
was appointed superintendent of the Agriculture and Arts 
Association of Ontario, a position he held until 1881; he was 
also, at various times, an officer of the Horticultural and 
Mechanical Association of the Town of London, of the Westminster 
Township Agricultural Association and of the Middlesex County 
Agricultural Society. Local societies (kept in business by a 
yearly provincial grant), and on a more important scale the semi­
official Agriculture and Arts Association, were key centres of 
political pressure and patronage. Among the members of such 
bodies could be found the Liberal senators Elijah Leonard and 
David Christie, as well as William Saunders, the future director 
of the Ottawa model farm. 
Thus in its move to western Ontario, the Grange, although de­
claredly non-partisan, acquired supporters in the politically 
well-connected reformist wing of the ruling Ontario Liberal 
Party. As the effects of the 1873 slump and of the crippling 
collapse of wholesale prices in the following five yearsiG were 
increasingly felt by the farming community, the Order and its 
gospel of reform enjoyed a period of spectacular success between 
1874 and 1878. The Dominion Grange, the Canadian 'chartering1 
body which presided over the proliferation of chapters that 
took place during those years, was set up in June 1874 in 
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London, Ontario; Henry Anderson was on the Executive Committee, 
and the American Quaker immigrant Squire W. Hill of Ridgeville 
was elected Master.I7 It was in April 1874 that the Conservative 
George T. Orton, MP for Wellington Centre began clamoring for 
a Parliamentary select committee on agriculture; it is hard to 
resist the suspicion that Orton*s sudden advocacy of the far­
mers; interests was partly connected with the events then taking 
place in his native rural Ontario. Conversely, the reaction of 
the Liberal George Casey, of Elgin County in western Ontario, 
seemed to echo the gospel of self-help: 
The Committee was not composed of farmers, but rep­
resented a sort of gratuitous interference by the 
gentlemen of the learned profession . . . The far­
mers had nothing to do with the movement [i.e. the 
Select Committee], knowing well their own business.18 
In short, Orton was told in no uncertain terms that he was 
poaching. 
The Conservatives' pressures had similar effects in the matter 
of protection and in the matter of agriculture as a federal 
concern. In both cases the administration introduced half 
measures. On the one hand, the Liberals in time implicitly 
recognized the strength of the case put forward by their oppo­
nents, and raised the tariff by an amount inadequate, as it 
was judged, to afford protection. On the other, in 1877 agri­
culture was allowed to surface at the federal level by means of 
a measure that would not really bring it within the scope of 
federal jurisdiction. 
The Dominion Council of Agriculture, the body often taken to 
mark the beginning of the agricultural branch fo the federal 
Department of Agriculture, was set up in April 1877 in order to 
advise the Minister on all matters pertaining to the farming 
interest. One of the twelve committees into which the Council 
was divided was on scientific agriculture. Eight of the thir­
teen councillors were drawn from the members of both Houses, 
and carefully balanced to represent all provinces as well as 
the North-West; only three members were Conservatives. The 
rest of the councillors were representatives of the two main 
agricultural associations of Ontario and Quebec. Most of the 
politicians were also members or officers of provincial agricul­
tural bodies. In other words, both the function and the member­
ship of the Council were chosen in such a way as not to threaten 
the existing pattern of decentralisation of agricultural af^ -
fairs.19 
The weight acquired by the Grange can be inferred from the com­
position of the Ontario delegation on the Council. All four 
members, naturally enough, were also members of the Agriculture 
and Arts Association of their province. Three of them were 
clearly Grange sympathisers. The first, Ira Morgan, delivered 
an urgent and official appeal in favour of the Order in his 
capacity as president of the Ontario Agriculture and Arts 
Association for 1876.20 The second, Stephen Vlhite, was one of 
the charter members of the Dominion Grange mentioned in the Act 
of Incorporation of 1877. In addition, the Rev Robert Burnet, 
the well-known horticulturist from Hamilton, was known to have 
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emphasised his recommendation to get rid of middlemen in fruit 
marketing with the cry: 'Organize, organize, organize.121 
Finally, the President of the Dominion Council of Agriculture, 
Senator David Christie, an Ontario Clear Grit, was a close ac­
quaintance of Stephen White's. 
Furthermore, .a few days before the appointment of the Council, 
the Bill of incorporation of the Dominion Grange received a 
third reading and was passed, after having been carefully shep­
herded through both Houses, respectively by Joseph Rymal, the 
Hamilton-area Liberal MP, and by the Liberal Senator and London 
manufacturer Elijah Leonard.22 once again, it would appear that 
the Liberal strategy was one of prudent nurture and control of 
the political forces that found their expression in the Grange 
movement, in the attempt to forestall the Conservatives' con­
quest of the rural vote. Indeed, even some clearly Grange-
inspired legislation reached Parliament in March 1878; William 
A. Thompson, Liberal MP for Welland argued at length in favour 
of the establishment of County agricultural banks owned and run 
by farmers, which would lend money at a low interest rate and 
improve the money supply.23 
The scheme never saw the light of day. In fact, the year 1878 
marked the failure of the Liberal strategy, a reversal of the 
rural vote and the ultimate defeat of the Mackenzie Government. 
The Dominion Council of Agriculture, during its short existence, 
was hampered in the fulfillment of its brief by the lack even 
of travelling funds for its members. W.A. Thompson, the advo­
cate of agricultural banks, died. The Grange itself entered a 
phase of decline as rapid as the expansion had been exuberant. 
By the end of 1879, the only solid things were the Tory majority 
and the protectionist tariff. 
Despite the final series of collapses, this first round of at­
tempts to bring agriculture within the purview of the federal 
government helped to clarify a few points. First of all, the 
issue of agricultural research could not stand alone. Everyone 
could see (indeed, the Tories based their campaign on it) that 
the farmers were squeezed between impoverished land and plum­
meting wholesale prices, but remedies for the latter could pro­
vide infinitely more political advantages than remedies for the 
former. In the Conservatives' arguments, agricultural research 
rode the coattails of the tariff. In the eyes of the Liberals 
and of their temporary allies, the Tories' talk of federal tech­
nical assistance to farmers appeared as a pretext for other 
Conservative measures — a Trojan horse carrying protection and 
centralisation. 
When, at the beginning of the 1880s, the second round of debates 
began, J.A. Macdonald was firmly in the saddle in Ottawa, and 
the Grange had lost its political weight. Nevertheless the 
terms of the problem, and those of the debates, did not change. 
In the face of a politically inevitable form of centralisation — 
a Dominion Experimental Farm — the critical point of the far­
mers' dislike of outside interference found its expression in 
the arguments over the type, of work a federal model farm should 
do. In the resolution of this problem emerged the figure of 
William Saunders, respected for his scientific achievements and 
a product of the above-mentioned rural Ontario network. 
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The 1882 Select Committee 'on the Operation of the Tariff upon 
the Agricultural Interests of the Dominion1 was another brain­
child of Orton's. Nothing could appear more harmless than the 
desire of taking stock after three full years of operation of 
the National Policy. The proposal, in fact, also received the 
support of Timothy Anglin, the New Brunswick Liberal MP; both 
sides of the House could hope to get the opportunity to show 
how their prophecies had been fulfilled.24 The scheme, however, 
soon became tainted; when an anticipated general election was 
called for 20 June 1882, the availability of a parliamentary 
report in French and English, ordered to be printed five days 
before the dissolution of Parliament, appeared too convenient 
to be just a coincidence. Especially when the slim report, 
after an impressive array of tabulated data, summed up: 
Since the Tariff came into operation our people 
have not only supplied the additional home market 
of $12,029,131, given by the exclusion of American 
farm produce, but have also exported very largely, 
which would lead to the conclusion that the pro­
tective Tariff had stimulated and encouraged the 
production of farm products.25 
The evidence was purportedly gathered by circulating a question­
naire to municipalities, agricultural societies and 'represen­
tative' farmers or, as James Trow, the Liberal MP from Stratford 
alleged, 'the Conservative members of the House circulated the 
questions only among their friends.'26 His party colleague John 
Charlton denounced the report claiming that it was 'purely an 
electioneering document and was issued for electioneering pur­
poses. '27 This accusation would be well substantiated if indeed 
the entire supply of reports destined for Wellington County 
was sent to Dr Or ton — as James McMullen, the Wellington North 
Liberal MP, bitterly complained.28 
Orton's insistent advocacy of agricultural interests responded 
to two principal needs. On a personal level, as the holder of 
a marginal rural seat, Orton had everything to gain from appear­
ing to be the sponsor fo initiatives that brought the agricul­
tural interest to the attention of Parliament. In a more general 
way, the Conservative party, traditionally weak in rural areas, 
was keen on disproving the Liberals' contention that the Tariff 
benefited manufacturers at the expense of the farmers. It was 
from such considerations, internal to the logic of politics, 
that the Experimental Farms System was born and not, as the 
other scientific departments of government, from the efforts 
of the scientific community at large. In the election of 1882, 
Orton's constituency became something of a test case when the 
Liberals put up the former Minister of Finance, Sir Richard 
Cartwright, as their candidate. Despite the advantageous re­
drawing of the boundaries of Wellington Centre achieved by 
Macdonald's gerrymandering, Orton did not undervalue the threat 
posed by Cartwright and pressed upon Macdonald frantic demands 
of last-minute patronage claiming: 'If Cartwright beats me 
they will say the farmers are against the N[ational] PEolicyD.'29 
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The effectiveness of Orton1s efforts to capture the farming vote 
was demonstrated when he won the seat by a majority more than 
five times larger than that he could hope to achieve through 
the gerrymander. It was clear that there was political capital 
to be made from measures manifestly aimed at promoting agri­
culture, especially since the provinces were not very active. 
Despite the concurrent powers of legislature granted by the BNA 
Act both to provincial and to federal governments, only a few 
provincial initiatives saw the light during the first fifteen 
years after Confederation. Admittedly, local agricultural 
societies existed throughout the Dominion, and in most provinces 
a council or a provincial association coordinated and super­
vised their activities. In Ontario and Quebec a cluster of other 
institutions, such as agricultural colleges and provincial ex­
hibitions, received provincial grants and thus warranted the 
existence of a government commissioner. Manitoba's institutions 
comprised a council, a board and a minister of agriculture, but 
they were all established in 1882 and for the next few years re­
mained in a rudimentary state. In New Brunswick a government 
stock farm, started in 1881, was the only sign of activity. 
Finally, the minister of agriculture of British Columbia also 
had three other portfolios which took up all of his time and 
energies. Federal schemes, in short, stood little chance of 
duplicating, or conflicting with, existing initiatives. 
Accordingly, parliamentary attention to agriculture increased 
after the 1882 election. Just as the nature and findings of 
Orton1s 1882 committee were being criticized, a new select 
committee, including Orton but not chaired by him, was completing 
its work with the reception of the last viva voce, testimony. 
The Conservative George-Auguste Gigault, the chairman of the 
select committee 'on the Best Means of Encouraging and Developing 
the Agricultural Industries of Canada,' made clear the politi­
cal aim he was pursuing. 'There are bounties for the fisher­
man,' he told Macdonald, 'for the manufacturers of iron, for 
the constructors of ships, and there is no special legislation 
for the benefit of the agricultural class.'30 But Gigault's 
committee showed a more sophisticated nature than that of pre­
vious similar parliamentary initiatives. It was not any 
longer — a wary Edward Blake was assured — a matter of curing 
the ills of agriculture by means of a financial measure, such as 
the Tariff, or of verifying its effectiveness. This time, 'it 
will be the business of the Committee to enquire into the pos­
sibility, on the part of the Department of Agriculture in 
Ottawa, to adopt the system [or] part of the system followed 
in Washington.'31 
Despite reassurances, a deeper internal logic, adumbrated in the 
debate of the 1870s, connected the diverse strands of the 
Conservatives' measures regarding agriculture. The existence 
of the United States, and especially their competition, pro­
vided a focus: George E. Foster, the future Sir George and 
member of Tory cabinets from 1885 to 1921, argued that the ex­
pansion of the aggressive American trade was spurred in 1867 
by the Canadian union. The creation of the US Bureau of 
Agriculture which distributed scientific information, he sug­
gested, was one aspect of that government's assistance of the 
new expansion. Canada could resist and compete; she could re­
sist by means of the Tariff, and compete by matching the US 
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support of agriculture by means of an equivalent institution.32 
It is debatable whether, and to what extent, Confederation stim­
ulated new ideas and activities in the US in general, and in 
Washington in particular. The import of Foster's statements 
should be understood in the context of the attempt to establish, 
not just the legitimacy, but the necessity and acceptability of 
formal federal intervention in agriculture. Two purposes were 
served by the choice of the American bureau as a model: on the 
one hand, it provided a useful precedent for the Tory tendency 
to centralise, on the other the reference to an American insti­
tution helped make the idea palatable to those liberal forces 
that preferred the US to Britain as a source of inspiration. 
The acceptance of the American model by J.-X. Perrault, the 
Liberal and anti-Confederationist from Quebec, former secretary 
of the 1877 Dominion Council of Agriculture, is a clear illus­
tration of the latter point. As for centralisation, the Tory 
political philosophy was explicit; the agricultural interest 
should not be left to take care of itself — that was old-
fashioned government: 
All the really great interests of the country 
ronce] were allowed to take care of themselves. 
Now-a-days, Governments take it as a rule of their 
conduct that all these interests shold be gradu­
ally drawn within their purview, and should be 
assisted by all the talent and skill they demand 
for their fullest development.33 
In short, 'talent and skill' were conceived as the instrument of 
government intervention; the Liberals' fears of the 'seventies, 
that science would be a pretext for centralisation, seemed to 
be realized. Furthermore, aside from the specific Canadian 
political rivalries, the issue of the centralisation of scien­
tific research was not particularly controversial. 
The principle received a blow of sorts in the US with the pas­
sage of the Morrill Act, which seemed to give the states a kind 
of sovereignty over scientific enterprise in agriculture. By 
the early 1880s, however, the poor performance of the 'Morrill' 
colleges gave rise to a few centralising attempts in the United 
States. Canadians were aware of these developments, as can be 
gathered from the comments of Thomas Bain, the Hamilton MP — 
one of the few Liberal members of the 1884 Gigault committee — 
and from the reports of the agricultural press.34 
Finally, the Government's case was all the more acceptable, if 
not persuasive, for being supported by a majority of about 
seventy seats in Parliament. Typically enough, the Select 
Committee set out with an avowed specific model in mind — the 
Washington bureau's activities as a clearing house of information, 
and the attached experimental farm — and concluded after two 
months' work 'That the Government take into earnest and favour­
able consideration the advisability of establishing a Bureau 
of Agriculture, and an Experimental Farm in connection there­
with. ' 35 
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The information gathered through the distribution of a question­
naire 'to addresses furnished on application by members of the 
House of Commons,1 and from nine days of hearings during which 
nineteen witnesses were interrogated, mainly provided a number 
of qualifications to the Tory plan. The real opposition came 
from those quarters of the farming community that distrusted 
anything connected with party politics. Apart from a general 
suspicion towards science as a form of book-learning voiced by 
one member of the Grange delegation, but by no means limited 
to members of the Grange, it was science insofar as it was com­
promised with politics that was disliked: 
If our farmers want to convert Ottawa, like 
Washington, into a dumping ground for all the rub­
bish of partisans and broken-down speculators, by 
all means let them favour the establishment of the 
proposed bureau.36 
William Weld, the author of the above passage, was the editor 
of the London Toih.m<LKb ' Advocate., 37 a nd a successful and enlight­
ened farmer. As a promoter of intelligent and systematic farm­
ing, he could not be suspected of opposing the federal project 
of experimental farming out of blind faith in rule-of-thumb 
methods. Weld's reservations stemmed, rather, from the belief 
he put forward in his influential paper that politics would make 
nonsense of the cause of scientific farming. In short, the re­
jection of party politics was compatible with the belief in the 
neutrality of scientific expertise. The implicit message was 
that the federal scheme could be acceptable if the men whose 
science was requested by the government would be known not to 
be sensitive to partisan pressures. Both the dislike of party 
politics Weld publicised and the distrust of bookish learning 
were traditional characteristics of the Canadian farming com­
munity. In a sense, the political characteristics of the sec­
tor of the economy — in this case farming — in which the 
government was proposing to intervene posed limitations as to 
the particular type of science and the particular type of scien­
tist that could be efectively used. The contrast between agri­
culture and geology will make this point clearer. 
4 
The meanings of the word science, as used in the arguments over 
governmental scientific institutions, covered a wide spectrum. 
In the first place, a systematic and accurate way of perform­
ing a task was often referred to as scientific. This was the 
meaning used, for instance, in the title Sclzntl^lc Znttdh. 
Making, a summary of techniques prepared by W.H. Lynch, of 
Danville, Quebec, and purchased, printed and distributed in 
thousands of copies by the federal government. Economic im­
plications followed naturally: the intelligent, educated 
systematic approach to farming could make a difference between 
success and bankruptcy. In anachronistic terms, 'scientific1 
farming could increase productivity and save the increasing 
number of marginal operations: 
The conditions of farming are altogether changed 
from what they were even a few years ago, when the 
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country was settled; it was labor then — now it 
is intelligence, and the consequent proper use of 
capital in farming.38 
There further followed a conclusion which concerned policy. If 
scientific farming was useful in marginal conditions, it could 
be dispensed with in non-marginal ones; indeed, it should be 
avoided, the TaKmaub' Advocate, argued, if it involved govern­
ment interference. The North-West was a case in point: 
Agricultural colleges in themselves, if properly 
managed, and where necessity demands are benefi­
cial. But what would be the use of going to the 
expenditure of thousands of dollars to build an 
institution in a country where any man who can 
farm a furrow can raise a crop from the virgin 
fertility of the soil?39 
It should be noted that the point of view described so far 
embodied a peculiar set of values. Science, understood as the 
rationalization of practice, was acceptable only insofar as 
it minimized losses, not insofar as it could maximize returns. 
In this restricted role, science was seen as having a practical 
and economic function which was in harmony with the notions of 
'making an honest living* and a 'fair profit,1 so extensively 
fostered by the Grange in the 'seventies.1 
Such an attention to the economic effects (and one particular 
economic effect, for that matter) of the introduction of science 
into farming, could not be more different from the understanding 
of science embodied by the Royal Society of Canada. Daniel 
Wilson's condemnation of the 'misapplied thrift' involved in re­
fusing support to abstract science, and similar pronouncements 
of other fellows, were in marked contrast with the parsimonious-
ness implicit in the objection to spending money even on prac­
tical research, unless dictated by necessity. 
Between the two. extremes was the range of options actually con­
sidered by government. Here, too, a particular understanding 
of the word 'science' went together with the political choice 
of drawing within the government's purview all the major inter­
ests of the country. The central concept was that of informa­
tion, and it affected not only the measures concerning the 
Department of Agriculture, but also the government's activities 
in the fields of public health, geology and meteorology. 
The usefulness of statistical information as an instrument of 
government became a central issue in Canada during the 1880s. 
The systematic collection of data coincided, up to a point, 
with the natural need of a largely unexplored country to find 
out about its physical geography, climatic characteristics and 
strategic potential. Among government initiatives that made 
use of scientists, as distinct from professional men such as 
surveyors, the Geological Survey and, after 1890, tidal research 
served in part the first purpose; the Meteorological Service 
essentially served the second; finally, the Hzptunz and ktant 
expeditions to Hudson Bay in 1884, 1885 and 1886 were originated 
by a desire to explore a possible alternative route to the West 
that would be safe in case of trouble with the United States.40 
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The last enterprise also employed personnel of the Geological 
Survey (Robert Bell), and of the Meteorological Service (A.E. 
Gordon, R.F. Stupart and F.F. Payne). 
But the federal government slowly extended its data-gathering 
activities beyond the need of knowing the essentials of the 
Dominion. In this, Canada was following in the steps of many 
other countries; the expansion of government into diverse areas 
of civil life — a widespread nineteenth-century phenomenon — 
was accompanied by a multiplication of special statistics. The 
parallel extension of the meaning of the word 'statist1 to in­
clude statisticians as well as statesmen reflected a change in 
the understanding of the function of government. At the same 
time, the works of AavantA like the Belgian Adolphe Quetelet 
(sometime tutor of the Prince Consort) and of civil servants 
like William Farr of the British Registrar-General's Office, 
developed the analytical tools of the discipline. Thus statis­
tics, which was associated with a notion of rational government 
since its eighteenth-century origins, became one of the new 
sciences of the nineteenth, and the ostensibly successful ex­
tension of the scientific method to human affairs. In this 
sense, the collection of quantified information by governments 
was by and large understood as an aspect of modernisation. 
It should be noted, however, that the traditional purposes of 
statistics were the collection of revenue and centralised poli­
tical control. Seen in this light, the gathering of data was 
intimately connected with the need of monitoring state income 
and expenditure; the first set of eduational statistics, for in­
stance, that appeared in Great Britain was a consequence of the 
granting of public funds to education in the 'thirties.'41 
Despite the aura of objectivity and neutrality lent to the dis­
cipline on the occasion of the establishment of the Manchester 
Statistical Society in 1883, and of the formation of the 
Statistical Section of the British Association the same year, 
the connection with matters of policy was direct. 
The constitutional structure of Canada gave a further political 
content to any discussion on statistics. All departments of 
government, federal and provincial, naturally collected those 
statistics that would enable them competently to administrate 
specific acts passed by Parliament or by local legislatures. 
But the general power to deal with statistics was restricted to 
the federal authorities by the BNA Act. The Department of 
Agriculture was chosen to deal with everything pertaining to 
the decennial census and other statistics. This state of af­
fairs was doomed to breed all manner of dissent between Grits 
and Tories, de-centralisers and centralisers. When the Liberals 
in 1878 proposed an appropriation of $5,000 for the preparation 
of criminal statistics (criminal law was also the exclusive do­
main of the federal government), Charles Tupper seized the op­
portunity to press upon the Government the need for an expansion 
and generalisation of statistical work, and in particular the 
compilation of vital statistics.42 «pne Prime Minister, Alexander 
Mackenzie, not only declared that the cost would be too high, 
but contested the exclusiveness of the federal administration's 
authority. 
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At the opening of the 1879 session of Parliament, the first 
since the return to power of the Tories, the Governor-General 
announced his Government's intention fto consider the pro­
priety of providing some means for the collection and collation 
of vital, criminal, and general statistics.143 Despite the 
constitutional objections raised in Parliament by Alexander 
Mackenzie and David Mills, the Act became the cornerstone of 
successive federal data-gathering activities.44 
During the days in which the Census and Statistics Bill were 
introduced and discussed in the Canadian Senate, the US National 
Board of Health was established. One of the first acts of the 
new institution was to ask the Canadian Meteorological Service 
to forward their reports to them, with a view to contribute to 
the study of the influence of the weather on health. A commit­
tee of the Canadian Medical Association, with the support of 
the Meteorological Service, approached Sir Charles Tupper in 
order to obtain support for a scheme of vital statistics which 
would include a line of research of the type suggested by the 
US Board of Health. Tupper, by then a member of the cabinet, 
not only was known to have gone on record in favour of central­
ised vital statistics, but was also the former first president 
of the Canadian Medical Association.45 The proposal was favour­
ably received by the Minister of Agriculture, J.H. Pope, but its 
implementation was postponed until after the 1881 census.46 A 
limited, 'cheap* scheme was in fact introduced in 1882; the plan 
was to gather and coordinate the data already collected in the 
eleven cities of the Dominion that had a Board of Health. The 
system, uspported by a yearly grant oscillating between ten-
and twenty-thousand dollars, survived amidst accusations of 
political favouritism and uselessness until 1891, when it was 
cancelled altogether.47 what was notable, however, was the 
fact that the Dominion government granted an admittedly small 
amount of money to a statistical study in a field in which it 
had no administrative stake. In this sense, the very approval 
of the scheme confirmed the political choice expressed by Tupper 
in 1878; conversely, the lack of a specific administrative pur­
pose, and the corresponding handing-over of most of the work to 
local officers, can account for the limited survival of the 
project. In other words, the collection of statistics not im­
plying some form of control seemed not to have a place in the 
type of government envisaged by the Tories. 
The type and amount of control over events afforded by statis­
tical information is open to question. If one of the purposes 
of statistical investigation is reliable prediction, then it 
provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for control. 
The hopeful 1880 submission of the Canadian Medical Association 
quoted Lyon Playfair as saying: 
Registration of death represents the wrecks which 
strew the shore, while that of sickness would tell 
us of coming storms and enable us to trim our vessels 
to meet them. Till we have such a system of disease 
registration, public health cannot be administered 
with full intelligence.48 
It may be noted, however, that public health could not be ad­
ministered with fiull intelligence also without, for instance, 
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reliable studies in the aetiology and prophylaxis of infectious 
diseases — those studies, that is, that Pasteur only started 
in 1877. More in general, and using the standard nineteenth-
century terminology, control was predicated upon the know­
ledge of facts and causes. From the point of view of the statis­
tician, the latter could be reduced to the former: the know­
ledge of 'dry facts1 would naturally imply the discovery of 
causes. Archibald Blue, the journalist and statistician who 
organised the Ontario Bureau of Industries (1882) and the 
Ontario Bureau of Mines (1891), and who was eventually called 
to Ottawa by the Laurier administration in 1900, put the case 
succinctly: 
The value of statistics is apparent in this, that 
it is mainly through the. paK6u>it oh &ta.ti.6t-lcal 
JLYiqalKÀ.0,^ we can be assured of real advance in 
the knowledge of human interests. The statist 
aims at discovering the actual conditions of his 
country and the. cau.6e.6 of that condition, with a 
view to discover also the methods of improving it.49 
Statistical information, then, was eminently factual informa­
tion. In the context of an administration aware of the develop­
ment of the new discipline and accustomed to gathering data 
for administrative purposes, the Canadian man of science was 
cast in the role of the supreme collector of facts — the 
custodian of a nineteenth-century myth, the scientific fact. 
The results of the extension of the inductive method to human 
affairs, statistics in turn became, in the world of Canadian 
politics, the model of what an empircal, practical science, 
useful to government, ought to be. 
The sciences that most approached the inductive model were those 
that clearly involved little theory, and mostly consisted in 
collecting, comparing, and classifying observations — in short, 
natural histroy as distinct from natural philosophy. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find that the sciences that found a 
place in the Canadian government were geology, meteorology, 
botany and zoology related to agriculture, and in particular 
entomology. It was not simply a matter of potential economic 
usefulness — the knowledge of tides was just as obviously use­
ful to shipping — but also of similarity with certain govern­
mental practices, traditional but latterly modernised, which 
were understandable by the layman, that is, the politician. 
An additional reason rendered natural history acceptable to 
politicians: there existed a presumption, which the officers 
of the Royal Society of Canada did not share, that simple sys­
tematic observation led directly to application. The natural 
sciences, especially in their observational and taxonomic as­
pects, were widely held to be just an initial, rudimentary stage 
in the ideal hierarchy of the sciences. Without recurring to 
the philosophical scheme of progressive stages of higher sci­
ences proposed by Comte, it may be sufficient to note that, at 
the meeting of the British Association in Montreal in 1884, 
British scientists, by broad agreement more advanced than 
Canadian and American, contributed almost all the papers for 
section A (mathematical and physical sciences) and B (chemis­
try) — in all more than one-third of British contributions — 
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while the largest number of presentations by North American 
authors was in sections C (geology) and D (biology).50 Sciences 
with an important theoretical content were considered higher 
and more advanced than empirical ones. Some members of the 
scientific community who accepted this hierarchy, such as the 
officers of the Royal Society of Canada, also held that useful 
applications could only follow theoretical, 'pure1 studies. Sir 
Lyon Playfair, mistakenly taking the Royal Society of Canada to 
embody a widespread Canadian belief, praised the Dominion: 
She knows that applied science does not come unless 
pure science precedes it — that the applications 
of science only come from the overflowing of the 
fulness of science itself; and Canadians asked the 
promoters of science for its own sake to go amongst 
them and tell them how they must advance that sci­
ence which has led to so many applications, and in 
that Canada showed great wisdom.51 
But a different opinion, and one more in harmony with the 
peculiar perceptions of government, also existed. According 
to this view, the higher status of theoretical sciences was not 
questioned, but the natural sciences were judged more practical 
and useful than the others, just because they made use of a 
minimum of theoretical apparatus. This contention was usually 
put forward by men whose scientific environment was that of the 
local societies, and not so much that of universities. William 
Gossip, the president of the Nova Scotian Institute of Natural 
Science, pointed out in 1879 how all the industries of Nova 
Scotia were connected with, and could benefit from, natural 
science.52 G.J. Bowles, of Montreal, equated the beginning of 
a science with its applicative stage; speaking about the state 
of the science of entomology in Canada and the United States, 
he commented: 
It is advancing in every respect. In Canada it is 
still in what we might call the pKCLctical stage — 
the knowledge we have is being applied, as far as 
possible, to the promotion of agricultural interests.53 
He looked with diffident awe to the courage with which American 
entomologists ventured into theoretical fields: 
In the United States the entomologists are doing 
good work in their different departments, and while 
the task of naming and describing is being rapid­
ly prosecuted, some of them have leisure even to 
aim of changing the arrangement and nomenclature of 
science. All honour to them for their industry 
and zeal, though some of their projects are too 
revolutionary, even for the present changeful age.54 
'Naming and describing,1 then, was the way of ascertaining use­
ful scientific facts in the natural sciences. Canadian politi­
cians, far from being willing to wait for abstract science to 
'ripen' or to 'overflow,' as the various metaphors went, showed 
a marked preference for the most elementary information men 
of science could provide. 
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The debates over the function of the Geological Survey are a 
case in point. What the politicians tried to do, crudely put, 
was to stop the geologists from indulging in sophisticated work 
and get them to collect mining statistics. The substantive 
issues, regarding the role of geologists in the government's 
pay, were clouded in 1884 by a prodigious explosion of rival­
ries within the Canadian Survey. The geologists publicly ac­
cused each other of lying, plagiarism, incompetence, authori­
tarianism, insubordination and lack of integrity.55 Principal 
Dawson's confident diagnosis was that the trouble was caused 
by the frustrated ambitions of Robert Bell and T. Sterry Hunt, 
'designing and troublesome men.'56 in practice, none of the ac­cusations and insults stemming from personal antagonisms made 
any difference; nobody resigned or was dismissed as a conse­
quence of the stormy atmosphere in which the hearings of the 
1884 Select Committee of the House of Commons on geological sur­
veys took place. As the chairman of the committee, the 
Conservative Robert W. Hall, stated, and as the final report 
shows, very little notice was taken of personal squabbles.57 
What was taken into account, and in the end affected the work 
of the Survey, was a complaint that had reflections outside the 
Survey itself. The department, it was alleged, had been left 
for too long without control and was producing scientific, 
'theoretical' reports, and not enough useful information. 
It is suggestive that the first complete articulation of this 
criticism in Parliament took place one year before the Select 
Committee was appointed, that is, the same year in which all 
the salaries of the members of the Geological Survey were placed 
on the Civil List, thereby freeing about one-half of the Survey's 
budget for further research expenses. The measure effectively 
increased the yearly grant from about $60,000 to about $91,000.58 
A stronger demand for political control accompanied the larger 
appropriation, so that more intimate links be formed between 
the scientific institution and the apparatus of civil govern­
ment. The opposition, in the person of George F. Casey, the 
journalist from Western Ontario, put the case first: 
If it is the practice of the Government to place 
an expert at the head of the Department, and 
leave him to do whatever he chooses, the hon. 
gentleman [ J.A. Macdonald ] could secure some land 
speculators in Winnipeg at very reasonable figures, 
if he would leave them to do the business of the 
Department without interference; and the work would 
be done thoroughly, but it does not follow that it 
would be properly done. Nor does it follow that 
because a man is a scientific man, he should know 
in which part of the country public policy re­
quires surveys to be carried on; on the contrary, 
if a man is a scientific man, he is not likely to 
trouble himself about policy as much as about in­
teresting scientific research. It might be a matter 
of great interest to him to know that Devonian 
strata existed at a certain place, without caring 
for the capabilities of the district for agricul­
ture or stock raising; but that is the interest of 
the Government.59 
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Casey, always an advocate of agricultural interests, declaredly 
wanted to reshape the Survey's activities so as to maximise the 
benefits to farmers. His plan included the collection and dif­
fusion of information on the soil in the North-West, and the 
development of phosphate mining. The latter turned out to be 
a highly sensitive issue. In fact, every year since 1880 
J.H. Pope, federal Minister of Agriculture, reported on the 
increasing demand for Canadian phosphates, mostly coming from 
the Ottawa region, on the British market. The Canadian mineral 
was transformed into superphosphate fertilizer in Britain, and 
then shipped to the United States and, in part, to Canada. 
Nobody, the minister complained, seemed to think of producing 
superphosphate for the American and Canadian markets right at 
the source.60 in other words, phosphates were of immediate or potential interest to farmers, mining propsectors, and manufac­
turers — which in turn made phosphates politically very inter­
esting. For good measure, the Geological Survey seemed to be 
delaying the publication of H.G. Vennor's report on phosphate 
mining in the Ottawa Valley. The hold-up was connected with 
Vennor's dismissal in 1881, when he was found to have speculated 
in phosphate lands. 
The Vennor case, in itself a minor administrative accident, 
became the catalyst that brought about political action. Casey's 
call for increased political control of the Survey, occasioned 
by the appropriation increase, and directed against useless 
scientific research, immediately acquired a referent: the 
Geological Survey was ostensibly delinquent in putting out a 
report that was not only practical, but also of potential im­
portance to the three fundamental economic interests of the 
country. In February 1884, Robert N. Hall, the Conservative 
member for the mining district of Sherbrooke, moved that a 
select committee be appointed to examine the function of the 
Survey, and illustrated his reasons for doing so referring to 
the missing Vennor report, during the debate over the Supply 
Bill.61 
The issues of administrative and political control, and of the 
usefulness of the Survey (summed up in the request for mining 
statistics) emerged during the work of the committee. J.A. 
Macdonald, who until 1883 also held the portfolio of the in­
terior and thus was formally responsible for the geological 
department, admitted that all policy decisions were left up 
to the director, A.R.C. Selwyn; he would set priorities, choose 
the areas to be explored each year, allot tasks, and hire and 
fire all employees. Selwyn's own perception of his powers con­
curred with that of Macdonald.62 Like Casey in 1883, the 1884 
critics of the Survey argued that the independence of the direc­
tor should be curtailed; the Liberals were most vocal and ex­
plicit, but the request was also implicit in the recommenda­
tion contained in the report of the select committee, that the 
activities of the Survey be regulated either by further legis­
lation or by departmental regulations.63 Even one of Selwyn's 
personal enemies inside the Survey, Robert Bell, the future 
acting director (1901-1906), went on record as endorsing poli­
tical control: 
[E.C. Baker (Victoria)] . Do you think it would 
be advisable for the Director of the Geological 
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Survey, be he who he may, to have absolute power 
in the selection of his staff? — CRobert Bell] 
Certainly not; that would be a dangerous power 
in any man's hands. 
[E.C. Baker]. Do you not think that political 
influence, or the mere fact of its being a 
branch of the Civil Service, is detrimental to 
the work and to the welfare of the Department? — 
CRobert Bell] Any interference might, or might 
not, be detrimental, but I think it is essential 
that the gentleman managing the Survey should be 
responsible to the people of the country, rather 
than to have an autocrat.64 
The task of the political head of the department, as it was 
envisaged, was twofold: to steer the government geologists1 
attention towards the study of resources useful for economic 
development, and to order the collection and distribution of 
mining statistics. The latter was at first considered by the 
select committee as a function that could possibly be performed 
by a new institution, separated from the Geological Survey; the 
consensus of the evidence collected, either by post or in \)i.\)a. 
voce sessions, and the committee's final recommendation was 
that the existing Survey be put in charge of the statistical 
work. A reason adduced was that there would be a large overlap 
between the new and old departments, both in expertise and ac­
tivities; such duplication could be avoided by having a few 
mining engineers join the Survey with the explicit brief of 
dealing with statistics. A more interesting reason, however, 
was suggested to the committee by John Wesley Powell, the 
director of the US Geological Survey: the collection of mining 
statistics would provide a 'skeleton' for the scientists' work. 
Geologists, as distinct from mining engineers, would provide 
scientific and technical commentaries on the areas and topics 
pointed out by the engineers' economic statistics.65 
Thus various strands of thought and practice seemed to con­
verge to produce a policy. Insofar as they were associated 
with administrative practice, statistics were known to be prac­
tically useful and to enable governments to intervene in selec­
ted areas of national life; the exemplary case was that of Nova 
Scotia, a province that routinely gathered reliable mining sta­
tistics in connection with the levy of a royalty. The same 
data, it was argued, could be of use apart from any tax-
collecting purpose; they would provide investors and industri­
alists with information about the economic potential of Canada, 
and attract capital. Finally, as a discipline that dealt with 
'facts,' statistics needed experts; by choosing the facts to 
be examined on the basis of economic relevance, it would make 
sure that the government geologists' expertise would be focussed 
on topics of manifest usefulness. In short, science, mediated 
by its extension to politics and human affairs, could find a 
precise place in government. 
The main problem, as Selwyn knew for having experienced it when 
he tried to collect and compile mining statistics in the early 
'seventies, was to obtain correct information from the owners 
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and managers of mines. They were liable to underdeclare in 
order to protect themselves against the possible imposition of 
a royalty, or they might overdeclare in order to attract inves­
tors. The work of compilation could not be accurate unless 
penalties were established for providing wrong information — 
a measure already taken in the United States and in Nova Scotia. 
The lack of such powers somewhat hampered the work of the small 
Section of Mines, composed of two engineers, formed inside the 
Survey. In 1887 the first statistical report was published, 
presenting tables on exports, imports and production of minerals 
for 1886; some data could be reconstructed on the basis of exist­
ing records such as those of the Department of Customs and 
Excise, but those regarding more technical aspects of mining 
were at the mercy of the accuracy and goodwill of those mining 
operators that bothered to fill out the questionnaire sent to 
them by the Survey. A glance at the Survey's annual reports 
shows that the proportion of answered circulars steadily de­
creased in time. Thus the schematic policy that emerged from 
the work of Hall's select committee was only partly realised. 
The Section of Mines concentrated successively on individual 
areas or industries (iron, phosphates, natural gas and petro­
leum, etc.) and prepared complete technical and statistical 
reports on them; a series of yearly personal visits and an ar­
ticulate system of classification of the information helped to 
make up, at least in part, for incomplete legislation. 
The necessity of introducing penalties for failure to report 
(or false report), in order to obtain useful statistical data, 
became apparent as governments rationalised their procedures 
and extended their sphere of action during the 19th century. 
Britain, for example, started a programme of civil registration 
(births and deaths) with the creation of the post of Registrar-
General in 1837, but introduced sanctions as late as 1874. 
By the 'eighties, however, the use of penalties was becoming an 
established practice. In the United States, the US Geological 
Survey was empowered in 1889 to collect statistics of mines; 
the same year, Ontario set a fine of $40 for making a false re­
turn of information to the Bureau of Industries, a body set up, 
as it was characteristically phrased, to 'collect useful facts 
relating to the agricultural, mechanical, and manufacturing in­
terests of the Province.' (45 Vic, cap. 5, Ontario). 
In fairness, it must be recognised that the function of statis­
tics envisaged by the Liberal government of Ontario was differ­
ent from that of the federal Tory administration. Rather than 
trying to find a mediation between administrative practice and 
scientific expertise, the Ontario Bureau of Industries (which 
mainly dealt with agriculture) proposed to use information as 
the instrument that would remove all the obstacles to the smooth 
functioning of a free market. Quite possibly, the two outlooks 
partly adumbrated the different conceptions of government held 
by Tories and Liberals; it may be more profitable, however, to 
consider how the very nature of the agricultural sector could 
determine the function that economic and scientific information 
could have. 
As has been mentioned above, the farmers tended to be suspicious 
of anything that smacked of bookishness or of government inter­
ference. Characteristically, the tolerated function of two 
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classes of outsiders was negative: scientists and politicians 
could be of service only as long as they could help to minimise, 
or better yet avoid, economic losses and disadvantages. These 
widespread feelings, together with the corresponding premium 
placed on self-reliance, self-determination, and ultimately, 
democracy, were traditionally represented in Ontario politics 
by the reform wing of the Liberal party. Accordingly, Archibald 
Blue articulated, and then realised in the organisation of the 
Ontario Bureau of Industries, the provincial Liberal govern­
ment framework (as opposed to d<Ll>Lg4.&tz) function in helping 
agriculture : 
Every farmer knows that the price of his products 
is regulated by the law of supply and demand. 
Prices naturally tend to the equilibrium found un­
der this law, and for a high price obtained under 
a false impression of scarcity the producer pays 
the penalty through prices running to the other 
extreme. The grain-dealer or the speculator on 
the corn-exchange, with a larger purse and better 
means of information than the isolated farmer, can 
learn the probable yield of crops sooner than any­
one else, and may sweep the markets before prices 
have moved. But if statistics were furnished by 
the Government everyone would be as well supplied 
with information as the dealer or the speculator 
on the exchange. Hence the value of authentic 
reports on the condition of crops throughout the 
country and the world.6** 
Accurate returns, the goal justifying the $40 penalty eventually 
established, were meant to have a specific function — one 
connected with the testing of new technical and scientific 
methods : 
The value of information depends on its accur­
acy. An annual record of trustworthy facts, 
setting forth the productive power and value of 
both land and labour when employed to the best ad­
vantage, could not fail to produce healthy, stim­
ulating effect. The influence of thousands of 
good examples would tell powerfully in favour of 
advancement all along the line. The counting of 
cows, a distinguished English agriculturist has 
remarked, is the first step towards their univer­
sal improvement.67 
The caution with which Blue expressed his faith in the progres­
sive value of the statistical knowledge of facts and causes, 
was justified by the touchiness of agriculturists. Governments 
and parties, provincial and federal, trying to woo the farming 
vote needed to appear to be providing services without meddling 
without telling the farmers what was best for them. To this 
end, the particular use of statistics described by Blue, based 
on liberal economic assumption and directed against a tradi­
tional foe of the farmers, middlemen, met the need with credi­
table accuracy. 
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At the federal level, the 1884 Select Committee on agriculture 
considered the possibility of recommending a nation-wide scheme 
of agricultural statistics. The plan naturally recommended 
itself: it was one of the activities of the US Bureau of 
Agriculture, the model explicitly chosen by the Gigault commit­
tee, and it was ostensibly acceptable to the agricultural 
interest. Furthermore, the federal administration seemed to be 
the one best placed to obtain information not only from the 
entire national territory, but also from abroad, where Canadian 
produce could be sold and where the crops of other nations could 
influence commodity prices. Despite the fact that the evidence 
gathered by the committee by means of a questionnaire strongly 
supported agricultural statistics,68 the idea received limited 
attention; of the two civil servants who discussed the issue, 
Archibald Blue not surprisingly praised the usefulness of the 
scheme but claimed that provinces could do the job best of all, 
while the Conservative farmer senior editor and co-owner of the 
Montreal Gazatta, John Lowe, the Secretary of the federal 
Department of Agriculture, expressed the opinion that the ex­
pense of collecting accurate nation-wide data would be too 
high.69 The final report recommended, almost as an after­
thought, 'to initiate and carry out a convenient and compre­
hensive system of gathering the latest and most useful infor­
mation, statistical and otherwise.f70 
Once again, as in the case of public health records, the only 
cheap way to obtain agricultural production data would have 
been to rely on provincial systems, which, in 1884-85, only 
existed in Ontario and Manitoba. Besides, as noted above, the 
particular type of statistical service acceptable for the farm­
ing community was more in tune with the political philosophy of 
the Liberals than with that of the Tories. As it happened, de­
spite the complaints voiced yearly by successive ministers of 
agriculture, no plan of federal agricultural statistics was 
developed until well into the first decade of the twentieth 
century. This neglect amounted to a divorce between the recom­
mended scientific and statistical activities, in contrast with 
the modu.6 operandi sketched out for the Geological Survey. The 
1884 Hall Committee (Geological Survey) produced a partially 
successful arrangement for the collection of mining statistics 
that would serve to orient the work of scientists, so that it 
may have a bearing upon economic activities. This may be la­
belled, for convenience, a 'Tory* way of using statistics, that 
is, as an instrument of government intervention. Conversely, 
the 1884 Gigault Committee (Agriculture) failed to generate a 
similar link between agricultural statistics and the scientific 
work of the proposed Experimental Farms. This was no doubt 
partly due to the fact that the type of statistics acceptable 
to the agricultural sector was, as argued above, of a framework 
or 'Liberal1 kind. And, as shown in the case of health statis­
tics, the Conservatives had little interest in schemes in which 
they did not have an administrative stake. The disagreement be­
tween farmers and government, however, also extended to the 
question of the kind of activity that the Experimental Farms 
would engage in. 
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J.A. Macdonald knew that the first and most troublesome question 
that would be raised in the House at the mention of a new item 
of expenditure was whether it would bring about financial gain. 
Accordingly, he re-interpreted the Experimental Farms* plan 
for the benefit of Parliament: 
We intend to have a model farm; we will obtain 
teachers, and the farm is intended to be worked 
by the pupils. Those pupils will be self-sustain­
ing. The hon. gentleman CEdward Blake, Opposition 
Leader] knows there are a great number of young 
men who are anxious to be educated as farmers, 
and who pay considerable fees to private teachers 
at this moment, in various portions of the country. 
There are gentlemen agriculturists who give hand­
some fees to be taught farming. No doubt, a 
Government farm, conducted on scientific principles, 
with competent teachers and a sufficient area to 
employ students, will be well attended, and the 
pupils will pay a reasonable amount for their 
education.71 
Macdonald's remarks, although possibly comforting for those 
of his audience who believed that a research institution should 
make a profit, had a mindless ring. William Weld, the editor 
of the ToLKmnh.t>% Advocate., thought that the very gaucheness of 
the Prime Minister's attempt to parry possible criticism justi­
fied the suspicion that there was no policy, but only the desire 
to give jobs to party faithfuls.72 weld thought he could see 
through the Ottawa government's desire to encourage agriculture: 
Encouragement, in the long run, does not encour­
age. Yes, it does: it encourages tyranny in 
its basest form. It debases the will and the 
self-dependent spirit of a free people. It 
creates multitudes of dupes and lobbyists to be 
played upon by a corrupt government at the ex­
pense of the people.73 
It should be noted that the encouragement here envisaged and 
rejected was supposed to come from the activities of the exper­
imental farm, after the projected statistical work had gone by 
the board. Indeed, since the actual birth of the agricultural 
branch of the federal Department of Agriculture coincided with 
the 1885 appropriation towards the establishment of a station 
for agricultural experiments, the above rejection was the direct 
outcome of the opposition to the very existence of the branch. 
It followed that even the scientific work of the station could 
be suspected of being an instrument of political interference, 
especially when the completion of the CPR in 1885, after the 
crisis of immigration into the North-West, seemed to promise 
renewed efforts to promote settlement in the prairies. In fact, 
after having been centred on the need to remedy the decrease 
in fertility of long-settled land, the discussions on scientific 
farming were beginning repeatedly to refer to the new problems 
posed by the western environment. The reports of John Macoun, 
the botanist and western explorer who joined the Geological 
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Survey in 1882, and of other members of the Survey such as 
Robert Bell, were among the evidence discussed during the 
sessions of the Gigault committee. The same reports were also 
the object of a short-lived but vicious attack of Henry Youle 
Hind, sometime professor at Trinity College, Toronto, and the 
geologist attached to the 1857-58 Canadian expeditions to the 
prairies, who accused the two authors of taking advantage of 
their scientific reputations to foster a grossly unrealistic 
favourable image of farming conditions in the North-West, in 
order to comply with government wishes.7^ Hind's allegations 
were doubtless motivated by an old grudge he nourished against 
the Geological Survey, 7^ but they also pointed out some of the 
dangers of any excessively close links between the general pol­
icy of the federal government and research for agriculture. 
The experienced judgment of Alexander M. Burgess, Deputy 
Minister of the Interior from 1883 to 1897, made him oppose 
in later years the proposal of associating the multiplication of 
federal agricultural research stations with the spread of the 
railway system in the North-West territories: 
Under no circumstances do I think it would be 
wise for the Government to assume the responsi­
bility of telling the farmers what they ought 
to do and what they ought not to do. With intel­
ligent, independent people to deal with the negative 
position is the safe one — that is to say, make 
as public as possible the results of your 
Government experiments, but let each man judge 
for himself how far he will be guided by them.7*> 
Like the discussed but not realised statistical work, then, also 
the experimental and scientific work was cast in a 'framework1 
role. The corresponding role of men of science, as both col­
lectors and sources of information, was not too different from 
that envisaged by the Master of the Dominion Grange, Squire 
W. Hill, when he saluted 'the sons of science [who] are scouring 
every heath, and prairie and wilderness, to see if some new 
grass lies hidden in some unexplored glade, if some rude stock 
of the first, can offer a new fruit to the hand of culture.'77 
The passage seems implicitly to refer to a type of institution 
which Canada, alone among British possessions, did not have: 
a botanic garden. But the expression itself was suspect: 
•farmers do not like it; they think it is scientific nonsense.'78 
In the follow-up to the Gigault committee, the federal government 
accordingly steered a very careful course, attempting to avoid 
the opposing accusation of uselessness and meddlesomeness. The 
first move was an indisputed success; the appointment of James 
Fletcher as Dominion Honorary Entomologist in June 1884 ful­
filled all requirements. As Fletcher himself testified, in his 
capacity as vice-president of the Ontario Entomological Society, 
insects destroyed yearly about ten per cent of the entire crop, 
for an estimated value of about twenty million dollars. Ento­
mologists could recommend ways to reduce or eliminate that loss — 
just the type of scientific information that could produce the 
economic effect described at the beginning of section 4. The 
American experience was a guarantee: 
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The United States Government is certainly not a 
Government to waste money upon a useless officer, 
but the United States has done more to support 
the service of entomology, and the study of eco­
nomic entomology than any other country. If the 
expenditure thus entailed were useless, the United 
States would not be the country to enter upon it.7^ 
In the Canadian case, even expenditure could be minimised. In­
stead of hiring William Saunders, the president of the Ontario 
Entomological Society, as Fletcher recommended, Pope bestowed 
an honourary title upon Fletcher himself, who, as an accountant 
with the Library of Parliament, did not necessitate a special 
appropriation. Besides, as the son-in-law of Collingwood 
Schreiber, the man who succeeded Sandford Fleming as chief 
engineer of the CPR in 1880, the new Dominion Entomologist did 
not lack support in Ottawa. 
William Saunders1 turn came in 1885. In September of that year, 
a cabinet shuffle, occasioned by Sir Charles Tupper's resigna­
tion as Minister of Railways and Canals, brought John Carling, 
the brewer and businessman from London, Ontario, to the head of 
the Department of Agriculture. Carling was the man who, as 
Ontario Commissioner of Agriculture and Public Works until 1871, 
started the process that led to the opening of Guelph Agricultural 
College in 1874. One of the new minister's first acts was to 
request his fellow townsman and noted scientist, William 
Saunders, to visit agricultural colleges and stations in Canada 
and in the US, with a view to preparing a report that would be 
useful towards implementing the Gigault committee's recommenda­
tions. 80 
Before the end of the year, Saunders travelled almost eight 
thousand miles and visited institutions in twelve states in the 
north-east and mid-west of the United States.81 The report he 
presented to the Minister of Agriculture, however, also included 
information obtained by correspondence from other stations and 
colleges in the US; a few sketchy pages on British and Continental 
examples were added at the end of the report, after the recom­
mendations. These, in turn, contemplated one central experi­
mental station of at least four hundred acres near Ottawa, and 
four 'sub-stations' that would respectively be located in 
British Columbia, the North-West Territories, Manitoba, and in 
one of the Maritime provinces. The scientific staff of the 
head office would lend their expertise to the more practically 
orientated personnel of the periphery.8^ 
Although it is clear that the American example was paramount in 
shaping the Canadian experimental farms, the Macdonald Govern­
ment's explicit policy was at variance with the decentralising 
tendency initiated by the Morrill Land Grant Act. The difference 
was all the more remarkable for the coincidence of the discus­
sion and acceptance of Saunders' scheme with the progress through 
the US Congress of the Hatch Act, a measure which firmly re­
established the practice of decentralisation in agricultural 
research. William Brown, the director of the Ontario Agricul­
tural College and long an opponent of a federal experimental 
farm, had no qualms about letting the Ottawa government know 
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about his preference for the American solution.83 Likewise, 
the Liberal MP David Mills (a resident of London, Ontario, like 
Carling and Saunders) criticized the Saunders plan on consti­
tutional grounds and, although not specifically referring to 
the United States, outlined an alternative very similar to the 
Hatch Act.8* The 'Hatch-Mills1 solution, involving federal 
grants to locally controlled institutions, would have disposed 
of the main reason for intervention adduced by the Tories: the 
inability of the smaller provinces and of the territories to 
find the large amount of funds needed for experimental research 
in agriculture. In other words, insofar as it kept the agri­
cultural stations network under the control of Parliament and 
of the scientific headquarters of the central farm in Ottawa, 
the Conservative's choice reflected a precise political will. 
It may be tempting to subsume the policies embodied in the two 
main federal scientific institutions, the Geological Survey 
and the Experimental Farms System, under the general heading 
'diffusion of science.1 The insistence on the value of factual 
information that can be noticed in all debates, and the amount 
of time, energy and money increasingly spent in preparing re­
ports, bulletins and pamphlets, can lend some validity to such 
an interpretation. Yet the account would be incomplete. The 
very existence of a totally new environment — the North-West — 
evidenced the need for new knowledge; in other words, circum­
stances materially required the conceptual 'advancement of 
science.1 Possibly, the conventional distinction between 
'science for government' and 'government for science' would be 
more fruitful. Although very seldom either extreme exists 
alone, it is undeniable that, in Canada, the former was by and 
large the case. What has been said thus far about the two 
largest institutions, supports such a conclusion; the goals and 
restrictions of internal politics established the terms in which 
the policies for geological and agricultural research were 
framed. But it can be argued that, similarly, external politics 
insofar as Canada could have any — were at the root of those 
other initiatives, in which the sponsorship of the federal 
administration seemed to be a case of 'government for science.' 
The granting of funds for the expenses connected with the 
International Polar Year of 1882 ($4,000), the 1882 transit of 
Venus ($5,000) and the 1884 meeting of the BAAS in Montreal 
($25,000), although not large appropriations, would appear at 
first glance to have been strictly for science's sake. But the 
first was a contribution to the transportation expenses of the 
entirely British expedition to Fort Rae; the second formed, as 
Charles Carpmael argued, 'a valuable addition to the British 
system of observations' by enabling Canadian observers to oper­
ate 'strictly in compliance with the instructions published for 
the guidance of British observers;'85 the third grant was in 
aid of a celebration of imperial solidarity. In short, all 
these cases were the consequence of a double British connection, 
political (the only official external relation of Canada) and 
scientific (a substitute for internationalism). The general 
primacy of the political component was shown by the difficulties 
encountered by other schemes in obtaining federal sponsorship, 
despite the support of the British Association, when they were 
not a part of a broader imperial plan (ethnological research, 
study of tides), or dictated by the rationale of internal 
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politics. 
The problem was that, for a government to sponsor science for 
science's sake, even if it were only one among diverse motives, 
there needed to exist as one of the terms of the intellectual 
and political life of the country a certain amount of faith, 
or trust, in the value of rationality. No such faith, or trust, 
was recognisable in the words or actions of the federal Tories. 
By way of contrast, faint traces of an old rationalistic mould 
could be detected, for instance, in the use of statistics en­
visaged by the Ontario Liberals, as well as, possibly, in the 
role outlined for the Geological Survey by David Mills in 1877; 
both cases, despite the drastically limited function allowed 
to scientific work, showed at least a recognition of the sem­
inal virtue of scientific research. Not so, in the case of the 
Tories. 
Clearly, the collaboration between members of a culture that 
valued rationality and system, and those of another based on 
expediency and rule-of-thumb required men of a special type — 
more precisely, a special type of men of science. 
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